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Introduction 
Humbug has the peculiar property of being always committed by others, 
never by oneselr. That is one reason why it is universaJly condemned. �o doubt 
we can agree that humbug is a Bad Thing; but what are we agreeing about? It 
proves ac;tonishingly hard to say. In trying to understand what humbug�. which is 
my main purpose, one soon finds that there are no satisfactory definitions available. 
I therefore propose to use an inductive approach for the most part. l shaJI offer a 
number or varied examples for consideration, hoping that we can eventually arrive 
at some reasonably accurate anaJysis of this elusive concept. There should be time, 
aJso, to renect upon the mischief that humbug can work, and to consider some 
ways of curbing the disposition to produce it. 
Chekhov's lady 
My first exhibit is drawn from Maxim Gorky's reminiscences of Chekhov: 
Once a plump, healthy, handsome, well-dressed lady came to him 
and began to speak a la Chekhov: "Life is so boring, Anton Pav­
lovick. Everything is so grey: people, the sea, even the flowers seem 
to me grey .... And I have no desires ... my soul is in pain ... it is like a 
disease." 
"It is a disease," said Anton Pavlovich with conviction, "it is a 
disease; in Latin it is called morbus rraudulentus." 
Fortunately, the lady did not seem to know Latin, or, perhaps, 
she pretended not to know it. 
Morbus fraudulentus, literally, "the fraudulent disease," is not listed in man­
uals or pathology, although the disorder is endemic, infectious, and seriously in­
jurious to thought, feeling and action. The Latin label is too opaque for common 
use, but "humbug" serves nicely. Chekhov's lady provides us with a clear and 
uncontroversial example of humbug. 
Bernard Shaw on disarmament conferences 
My next example is taken from an interview granted by George Bernard 
Shaw to an American journalist (M.E. Wisehart) in 1930, on the eve or a naval con­
ference. When the interviewer called the corning meeting a "disarmament confer­
ence," Shaw strenously objected: 
"Don't!" exclaimed Mr. Shaw. "Everyone knows it's an armament 
conference!. .. The question is not 'Shall we do away with arma­
ment?' but 'How much armament?"' 
The interviewer referred to the preliminary conversations between the British prime 
minister and President Hoover as "an event of great historical importance," and 
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went on to say: 
It is a harbinger of international understanding and good will. ll 
has brought the English-speaking peoples together as neve-r before 
and shown them that in sentiment. friendship, n'spect and good will 
they are united. 
Shaw exploded: 
"Do you really believe that?" he exclaimed. 
"Humbug." 
When the interviewer said "Why do you say 'humbug'?," Shaw replied: 
"Because, generally speaking, Englishmen and Americans do not 
like one another. Now they are asked to pretend that they do. 
And this pretense of being affectionate cousins is as dangerous as 
poison. Better to confess our dislike--our hatred, if you please--and 
ask ourselves what it is all about. Then there would be the possi­
bility of ridding ourselves of it." 
The Shavian probe 
Bernard Shaw's formula, "Do you really believe that?" is a useful device; but 
it needs to be generalized into "Do you really .!!!!.!.!!. that?" in order to fit cases 
involving something other than belief. In this form, it is a useful blunt instrument 
that deserves a label. I propose to call it the Shavian probe. 
Unfortunately, it won't always work. No doubt, a journalist who actually 
thought in terms of bringing nations "together as never before" so that they be­
come "united" in "sentiment, friendship, respect and good will" would be well­
advised to change his occupation--perhaps to that of a speech-writer for presiden­
tial candidates. So in the case I have cited, Shaw's accusation of humbug seems 
justified. 
But what are we to make of the following episode? On January 25, 1980, 
Mary McCarthy said, in an interview with Dick Cavett on Public Broadcasting, that 
Lillian Hellman was "a bad writer, overrated, a dishonest writer!' Well, true or 
false, justified or not, there was no humbug about that. But on being asked by Mr. 
Cavett what was dishonest about Miss Hellman's writing, Miss McCarthy continued: 
"Everything. I once said in an interview that every word she writes is a lie, includ­
ing 'and' and 'the'." Well, did she really believe that one could lie by using the 
words 'and' and 'the'? Hardly-unless she was using 'lie' in some extraordinary and 
unusual sense. But no doubt Mary McCarthy was in earnest, and did mean what 
she said, was using just the words she wanted. Now that leaves the question of 
whether McCarthy committed humbug still unsettled: we have to undertake a diffi­
cult and controversial evaluation of the speaker's feeling and attitude. 
According to Miss Hellman's lawyer, his client may get damages for defama­
tion if she can show that "the person making the allegedly deramatory remarks 
3 
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either knew them to be untrue or uttered them without caring whether they were 
untrue." A philosophical logician might object that truth. in the sense of conform· 
ity with ascertainable matter or raet, is not in point. Yet a writer can be dishonest 
while saying something that is neither true nor untrue: common sense would re· 
gard some caricatures as libellous even if they were uncaptioned. When the lawsuit 
is ultimately heard, it will be interesting to see how judge and jury will cope with 
the possibly extenuating effects or context--and with such controversial issues as 
the applicable legal constraints on emotive or offensive language. 
Some preliminary comments 
Chekhov's lady and Shaw's interviewer provide us with clear and uncontro· 
versial cases or humbug. I think or them as touchstones of usage--"paradigm cases." 
For me, the two examples are cases of humbug if anything is: if you disagree, then 
your usage of the keyword dirrers in important respects from my own. 
These paradigm cases have some readily discernible features that are worth 
noting, for future references in struggles with more controversial examples. 
One re:ason why 'Humbug!' is so offensive an exclamation is that it charges 
the speaker with some kind of falseness. But in neither or our cases was the speaker 
supposed to be lying. For Chekhov's lady was not necessarily lying when she said 
that everything looked and felt "grey" to her: perhaps she used that very word in 
her private thoughts. Humbug need not entail lying in the strict sense of that word-­
even though humbug can be akin to outright lying:. 
We can usefully distinguish between the speaker's message, as I shall call it, 
and his or her stance. By the message I mean whatever is explicitly said about the 
topic in question; while I reserve the term 'stance' for the speaker's beliefs, attitudes 
and evaluations, insofar as relevant to the verbal episode in question. To illustrate: 
If you say to me in a confident way, "The plane leaves at four o'clock," you are 
not �that you believe what you say, because that is not the topic on which 
you are supplying information. But of course, by speaking as you do, in a standard 
situation in which trustworthy information is normally expected, you are giving 
me reason to believe that you are not deliberately misleading me. 
Similarly, Mary McCarthy, to return to the earlier example, was not saying 
that she despised the object of her scathing comments, nor was she overtly claiming 
to be sincere, but clearly she spoke as one who expected her remarks to be taken 
as a sincere expression of contempt. (Try saying: "She's disgusting--but of course I 
don't feel disgust." That would be a paradox: we could make some sense of it, but 
not without hard work.) 
Now, the pejorative implication of a charge of humbug is commonly levelled 
against the content of a message (a remark, or a text) rather than at what I have 
called the speaker's stance: it then has the force of "Stuff and Nonsense�· denigra­
ting the message, without necessarily imputing falseness or insincerity. Consider the 
following mini-dialogue: 
4 
First speaker: "As McLuhan has taught us, the medium is the mess­
age." Second speaker: "Humbug!" 
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Here I take the second speaker to be rejecting McLuhan's absurd slogan. i.e. 
rejecting the substance of what is being said: then> need be no imputaLion about 
the sincerity of the speaker's "stance." For he or she may genuinely regard Mc­
Luhan's wide�y quoted fragment of pseudo-wisdom as profoundly illuminating. 
No matter: without impugning a speaker's stance. we can sometimes condemn what 
is being said as balderdash, clap-trap, rubbish, cliche, hokum. drivel. buncombe. 
nonsense. gibberish or tautology. With so rich a \"Ocabulary for dismissing the sub­
stance of what is said, we could dispense with this use of 'humbug.' That useful 
word might well be reser\"ed for criticism of a speaker's stance -- to discredit the 
message's provenance. rather than its content. But I shall respect current usage by 
sometimes using 'humbug' in the sense of 'piece of humbug.• 
What then is the prima facie charge against a speaker accused of humbug? 
Well, some of the words that immediately suggest themselves are: pretense. pre­
tentiousness, affectation, insincerity and deception. Often. there is also a detect­
able whiff of self-satisfaction and self-complacency: humbug goes well with a 
smirk. A common symptom is 'clever-me'-ism, as in Jack Homer's case. In this 
respect, it resembles cant. which Dr. Johnson memorably defined as "A whining 
pretension to goodness, in formal and affected terms." 
To say that humbug has something to do with insincerity and deception is to 
point in the right direction, but does not sufficiently identify the word's meaning. 
Let us see whether the history of the word's changing uses can provide a more 
specific analysis. 
A short history of the word's shifting meanings 
I used to think that the word 'humbug' came into general use in the nine­
teenth century-possibly because I took the Victorians to be especially prone to 
hypocrisy. To my surprise, I discovered that its career dates from the middle of the 
eighteenth century, when it seems to have entered the language as "a piece of 
fashionable slang" (Century Dictionary) of unknown origins. It may have been 
used originally in the restricted sense of a false alarm. a hoax or a practical joke. 
But its meaning was uncertain, even from the start. In 1751 81 writer complains 
about it in the following terms: 
There is a word very much in vogue with the people of taste and 
fashion, which though it has not even the 'penumbra' of a meaning 
yet makes up the sum total of the wit, sense and judgment of the 
aforesaid people of taste and fashion! l he gives quotations l Hum­
bug is neither an English word, nor a derivative from any other 
language. It is indeed a blackguard sound made use of by most 
people of distinction! It is a fine make-weight in conversation, and 
some men deceive themselves so egregiously as to think they mean 
something by it! 
The Student (17 61)1 111 41 
[from Century Dictionary J 
Dr. Johnson did not include the word in his dictionary (1775), possibly because he 
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thought it too coarse or vulgar to be noticed. 
By 1828 the first edition or Webster's dktionary treaLS ·humbug' as an 
approximate synonym for 'swindle' OT 'fraud '. As a noun,Webst.er says, it refers to 
"an imposition under false pretenses": and as a verb it means "'to decei\'e; to impose 
upon"--or, as we might nowadays say, "to con." So the relatively innocent old 
sense or a practical joke had made way by then for something more obnoxious. 
Webster's Third New lntemationaJ Dictionary of 1966 contains the following 
entries: 
(for the noun's head �nse}: "something designed to deceive and mis· 
lead" [ with cross-references to QUACKERY, HOAX, FRAUD and 
IMPOSTURE] 
(for the verb): "impose on" l with cross-references to DECEIVE, 
CAJOLE and HOAX] 
(for its application to a humbugger): "a person who usually wilfully 
deceives or misleads others as to his true condition, qualities, or atti· 
tudes, one who passes himself off as something that he is not L with 
cross-references to SHAM, HYPOCRTTE and IMPOSTER] 
The general impression left by this rather confused set of definitions is of adher­
ence to the s,trong nineteenth-century equation or a humbug with an imposter or 
swindler. But that identification fails to reflect present usage. If a main sense of 
'humbug' were that of something designed to deceive and mislead, a skillfully con­
structed wig would have to count as a prime example. If a humbugger is a person 
who wilfully deceives others , then the pseudo-Arabs lately used by the F.B.L to 
"sting" selected congressmen would be properly described as humbugs. Something 
is plainly wrong. By relying too much on the entries in earlier editions, the makers 
of Webster's Third have overlooked the present dilutions of the old intensely pejor­
ative implications of 'humbug'. I hope that in the end we can do somewhat better. 
However, before examining some further examples of suspected humbug, I would 
like to pay homage to Phineas Taylor Barnum (1810-1891), now unjustly forgotten, 
but long regarded by Americans and English as a supreme humbug. I think this un· 
fair to an extraordinary man, who deserves a better reputation. 
A good word for Barnum 
If Barnum is remembered at all today, it ls as a presumptive co-founder of 
the still-flourishing Barnum and Bailey circus. The dubious attribution to him of 
the well-known quip that "There's a sucker born every minute" hints at a some­
what unsavory career: significantly, Neil Harris's fine biography (on which I have 
relied for details of Barnum's life and career) bears the title, Humbug: The Art of 
P. T. Barnum (Boston: Little Brown, 1973). 
How many people realise today that Barnum was once an international celeb­
rity, as wid�ly known as, say, Charlie Chaplin in our own century? Or would 
suspect that lhe was widely admired, with affection and respect'? When he died in 
1891, Barnum's advertising escapades were forgiven, even by those who had been 
his severest critics. "French newspapers called hiim 'a great benefactor' and •the 
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incomparable'. whose name is immortal" (Harris. 280\. And e\'en the London 
Times. which had thundered its disgust al his unabashed self-promotion. handsome­
ly concluded that ··His death removes an almost dassical figure ... [H]is name is a 
pro\'erb aJreadly. and a pro\'erb it will continue until mankind has et>ased lo fillld 
pleasure in the comedy of the showman and his patrons--the comedy of the harm· 
less deceh•er and the willingly decei\·ed'' (Harris. 280). 
Barnum did ha\'e many vehement detractors: one reviewer of his best·sE'lling 
Autobiography called the book "the shameless confessions of a common imposter. 
who has taken money of the public by downright falsehood," charged him wmth 
"a narrow and heated mind," thought his success arose from the public's "fanatic· 
ism" and "greed." and castigated American affection for him as sympathy with 
trickery (Harris, 226). In England, the book's reception was even worse: Black­
wood's called it Barnum's most daring hoax, which stimulated ·•amai.ement at its 
audacity, loathing for its hypocrisy. abhorrence for the moral obliquity which it 
betrays, and sincere pity for the wretched man who compiled it" (Harris, 227). 
Fraser's magazine claimed that Barnum would have been tarred and feathered in 
England (Harris, 228). Yet the target of such obloquy was graciously received by 
Queen Victoria, and had Horace Greeley, Mark Twain and Thackeray among his 
friends. 
How is one to make sense of this confusing record? Was Barnum a vulgar and 
shameless swindler? I don't think that anybody who reads his entertaining Life 
would think so. Some of his earlier exploits did, to be sure, embarrass him in later 
life. For instance, his exploitation of the slave, Joice Heth, who claimed to have 
been George Washington's nurse and to be one hundred and sixty-one years old. 
(Though "partially paralyzed, totally blind and toothless, [she I was nevertheless 
very spirited, talking about her years with 'dear Jittl� George' and lasping into 
occasional hymns" (Harris, 21). The crowds who flocked to see Joice--or, later, to 
examine the corpse of the "Feejee Mermaid"··could hardly have really beliE'ved 
her credentials or generally accepted Barnum's claims for the authenticity of his 
exhibits. It satisfied Barnum if they were sufficiently curious to pay the price of 
admission. His assiduously cultivated gifts were those of a magnificent showman 
and advertiser, who knew how to tickle and mystify his public. He was like the 
magician who seems to saw a young woman in half: the onlooker's fun is in trying 
to understand how the deception is worked: we are in the realm of illusion, not 
delusion. 
What particularly endears Barnum to me is his robust sense of humor. Visit· 
,ors to his great American Museum would see a notice reading '"To the Egress"·· 
which led them, not to yet another exotic animal, but only to the exit. When he 
built his extravagant mansion, "lranistan," in Bridgeport, Connecticut, "a fantastic 
multiturretted oriental palace surrounded by gardens and fountains, filled with 
rosewood, marble, velvet, and lace" (Harris, 102), he would arrange for an elephant 
to be seen pullilng a plow when a train came by! 
I suggest, accordingly, that in spite of the now almost proverbial association 
between BarnUJm and the practice of imposture, he ought to be rather remembered 
as a supremely talented public entertainer, and not as some sort of swindler or 
deceiver. The crucial point is that in Barnum's most successful exploits his audience 
freely collaborated in the entertainment (as in the case of the great General Tom 
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Thumb, who really was a midget of extraordinary resourcefulness and taJent): some· 
times being offered a puzzle to be solved-but always getting their money's worth. 
If this is humbug, it ought to be regarded as harmless, involving a kind of innocent 
pretense akin to the celebrated suspension of disbelief that we accept as part of a 
good reader's response to literature or art. 
In my opinion, then, Barnum's ingenious effort, in his book, Humbugs of 
the World, to distinguish his practice from that of common swindling or impos· 
ture, was eminently justified--even though he himself succumbed in the end to the 
prevailing ambiguities and included in the book many a story of sinister and inde­
fensible public traud. 
Back now to further examples of clear cases and test cases. 
Russell's tirade 
Consider now the following glimpses of the private behavior of a famous 
philosopher. In his charming book, Remembering Russell, Rupert Crawshay-Will­
iams tells of a trip to inspect a house that was being remodeled for Bertrand Russ­
ell's use. When the two friends arrived, they had to suspend a lively discussion of a 
new book by the pragmatist F.C.S. Schiller. The builder and the architect were 
waiting to hear Russell's complaints. 
8 
Russell walked in, said good-morning, and··immediately, without 
any other preliminaries, without any working up of steam--he boiled 
over into a furious denunciation of everything that the builder and 
the architect had done and not done. His face got red, his voice rose 
an octave, he banged the builder's flimsy table. 
The b1!.lilder and the architect were so taken aback by this ,eruption 
that they were speechless for the first few minutes. They went pale 
with astonishment: their lips trembled. 
Eventually the architect recovered himself. 'But, Lord Russell, you 
are not allowing for our difficulties. We simply could not get hold of 
the timber ... ' 
'That is a lie!' said Russell, banging the table once again so that all 
the pencils and set-squares and boxes of nails bounced and rattled. 
'There's no possible excuse.' 
Later, the architect tried again: 'Lord Russell; I really do not see 
why we should take this .. .' 'I don't care what you see or don't see .. .' 
Russell would hardly allow either of them to finish a sentence. The 
tirade rolled over them until both of them were left floundering and 
gasping. 
Russell ended off by demanding a complete change in their future 
behaviour. He stopped talking and walked smartly out to the car; we 
got in; I started the engine; 
'So Schiller was really making the context of the statement part of 
its meaning,' said Russell. 
Elizabeth and I were still stunned. 
'But B�rtie,' we said, 'you seem quite calm!' 
9
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·1 am qui Le calm,' he said. 'That's taught them a lesson 1 think. 
hasn'L it?' 
·\\'e certainly think they were impressed. Do you mean to say.' 
we asked. 'that the whole explosion was deliberate and contrh'ed?' 
'Yes indeed.' said Russell. 'it was the only thing to dO··the only 
way of making an effect.' 
'Well. I suppose it may work,' I said. 'But I did think you were 
being just a little bit unfair at times.· 
'Unfair! Of course I was being unfair.' 
Crawshay-Williams, reverting to a previous conversation, then s�id: "Thert> you 
are ... it's what we were saying last night: yo1.1're an aristocrat, and I'm merely a 
gentleman." Fair comment, although the English code forbids a genlleman lo call 
himself a gentleman, except ironically. 
Ghotbzadeh 's indignation 
At the end of January 1980, the Canadian government announced the escape 
of six American diplomats who had been sheltered in the Canadian embassy in 
Teheran. 
One of the so-called "embassy militants" responded by crying ''That's illegal! 
That's illegal!" (Associated Press, reported in the Cornell Daily Sun, January 30, 
1980). When the Iranian Foreign Minister later met reporters, he took the same 
line, calling the secret operation a "flagrant violation" of international law (New 
York Times, 1/31/80: A22). 
"They have violated the laws they claim l.o defend," Mr. Chotbza. 
deh said of the Canadians. He denounced "so-called international 
laws" as having been made only "for the suppression of tlhe small 
nations by the big ones" (NYT, 1/31/80:A 10). 
To this egregious nonsense, Ghotbzadeh added ai veiled incitement to violence·· 
.. Canada will pay" and "Everybody is free to do whatever they lsicJ want,"·· 
apparently inte:nding "an open invitation to Iranians around the world to take ac· 
tion against Canada or Canadians." Also an allegation, that he must have known to 
be a lie, to the effect that he had received an apology from the Canadian Prime 
Minister, with an accompanying explanation that "the action had been for political 
reasons in Canada" (both immediately denied by Mr. Joe Clark). 
In this farrago, I am particularly interested for present purpose in the role 
played by what is surely a prime case of humbug, the implicit presentation of the 
speaker (what I have previously �lied his "stance") as one who, himself respecting 
international law, is therefore entitled to complain of an alleged violation. Gotbza· 
deh 's own explicit denunciation of "so-called international law" merely adds to 
the confusion of what the Times editorial called his "flagrant logic." 
Emerson's friendship 
Ralph Waldo Emerson says the following about friendship, in his celebrated 
9 10
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esuy with that title: 
The moment we indulge our ar!ections, the earth is metamorphosed: 
there is no winter and no night: all tragedies, all ennuis vanish,··all 
duties even; nothing fills the proceeding eternity but the forms all 
radiant of beloved persons. Let the soul be assured that somewhere 
in the universe it should rejoin its friend, and it would be content 
and cheerful alone for a thousand years. 
Well, all or us have sometimes been kept waiting for a good friend, but a delay of a 
thousand ye·ars is, as the English say, "a bit much." But Emerson is relentlessly 
enthusiastic about friendship: 
Happy is the house that shelters a friend! ft might well be built, 
like a festaJ bower or arch, to entertain h�m a single day. Happier, 
ir he know the solemnity of that relation and honor its law! It is no 
idle bond, no holiday engagement. He who offers himself a candi­
date for that covenant comes up, like an Olypian, to the great games 
where the first-born of the world are competitors. He proposes him­
self for contest where Time, Want, Danger, are in the lists, and he 
alone is victor who has truth enough in his constitution t·o preserve 
the delicacy of his beauty from the wear and tear of all these. 
Surely there is something suspicious about this 1exaggerated rhapsodizing. Indeed 
the very last paragraph of the essay suggests that Emerson might really have pre­
ferred the kind or friend that need never be met: 
It has seemed to me lately more possible than I knew, to carry a 
friendship greatly on one side, without due correspondence on the 
other. Why should I cumber myself with the poor fac� that the re­
ceiver is not capacious? It never troubles the sun that some of his 
rays tall wide and vain into ungrateful space, and only a sma11 part 
on the refiecting planet. Let your greatness educate the ,crude and 
cold companion. It he is unequal he will presently pass .away; but 
thou art enlarged by thy own shining, and no longer a mate for 
frogs and worms, dost soar and bum with the gods of empyrean. 
"It never troubles the sun that some of his rays faJI wide and vain"-·"Thou 
art enlarged by thy own shining." Enlarged or puffed up? Emerson sometimes re­
minds me of Mr. Pecksniff, who is described on his first appearance in Martin 
Chuzzlewit as "a moral man, a grave man, a man of noble sentiments, and speech.,, 
Dickens says of him (in connection with his calling his daughte·r Mercy a "playful 
warbler"): 
10 
"Playful··playful warbler," said Mr. Pecksniff. It may be observed in 
connexion with his calling his daughter "a warbler,'' that she was not 
at all vocal, but that Mr. Pecksniff was in the frequent habit of using 
11
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any word thal occurred to him as ha\'ing a good sound and rounding 
a sentence well. without much care for its meaning. And he did this 
so boldly and in such an imposing manner that he would sometimes 
stagger the wisest people with his eloquenC't' and make them gasp 
again. 
The Czar's vodka 
The back cover of The New Yorker's issue of January 21, 1980 displays a 
richly colored photograph captioned "The spirit of the Czar livt>s on." We see- an 
impressively bearded man, head tossed back, with a smidgeon of a smile, dressed in 
full regimentals, with scarlet jacket, white sash, and enough medals to start a col'lec­
tion. In one hand he holds a wine glass. with the other he is fondling the Mck of a 
fine Borzoi. Meanwhile his Czarina, with an equally lavish display of evening dress 
and jewels, squats on the imperial carpet to play with a couple of Borzoi puppies. 
And the message? This, in part: 
It was the Golden Age of Russia, and the Czar reigned supreme. 
Europe, Asia: all the empire was his. Regal coaches carried him in 
elegance, but with his, Cossacks he rode like thunder. Hunting wild 
boar in the northern forests, hosting feasts for a thousand guests in 
the Great Palace, no man could match the Czar's thirst for life. And 
his drink? The toast of St. Petersburg. Genuine Vodka. 
[I have omitted the trade name of what I think of as 
"Humbug Vodka."] 
It would be a waste of time to criticize this text by asking such questions as why 
the pseudo-czar is wearing all those medals--or why he "rode like thunder," or 
whether he really did thirst for life as nobody else could--or what all this has to do 
with the barely perceptible difference between one vodka and another. We know 
that good sense and relevance have nothing to do with the case, the desired effect 
on the impressionable reader being achieved if favorable associations are created. 
Zaftig bedfellows 
Consider now the following item from the .. Personal" columns of The New 
York Review of Books (February 21, 1980): 
ZAFTIG FEMALE WANTED, NYC male, 35, editor/author, lean, 
reasonably good-looking, financially secure. Seeks woman Renoir 
would have painted, 25-35, with pretty face, stable personality. Ex­
cellent opportunity to share museums, movies, affluence, quiet con­
versations, caring, maybe marriage. NYR, Box 2956. 
If you think this hard to beat for vulgarity, listen to the journal's own puff, on the 
same page, for its new English affiliate: 
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AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS too wann and bloody open for you? 
Prefer treacle in your taJU, not your mail? Tired of being mashed by 
provinciaJ American bangers? Woo your very own little gooseberry 
fool abroad merely by running an accurate but winning Personal Ad 
in the columns or The London Review or Books. 
A rare example ot this puffing a go-between. It might be called pumping for a pimp 
·-Or meta-pimping. 
The Cornell ship 
C-eremoniaJ and politicaJ occasions invite humbug. Here is a prime example 
Crom the early history ot Cornell University: 
On Inauguration Day, October 7, 1868, the new university h.ad so many more 
students than it could handle that "the department ot geology was confined to a 
single room adjoining the coaJ cellars, and demonstrations in natural history were 
conducted in the vacant space next to a furnace" (Becker, 132). The campus con­
sisted partly or "a ravine six or eight feet deep, bridged by two dirt causeways" 
(Becker, 134). Against this kind or backdrop, George William Curtis delivered an 
elaborate address with the following peroration: 
Here is our university, our Cornell, like the man-of·war, aJI its sails 
set, Its rigging full and complete from stem to stem, its crew em· 
barked, its passengers all ready and aboard� and even as I speak to 
you, even as the autumn sun sets in the west, it begins to glide over 
the waves as it goes forth rejoicing, every stitch of canvas spread, all 
Its colors fiying, its musicaJ bells ringing, its heartstrings beating with 
hope and joy (Becker, 135). 
"Complete from stem to stem"··and the students in the coal cellars! Andrew 
Dickson White, "looking out over the ragged cornfield and the rough pasture land 
and noticing the unfinished buildings and the piled·up rubbish," felt that no words 
"could fall more completely to express the reality" and Ezra Cornell confessed that 
there was "not a single thing finished'' (ib.). Curtis, one might say, was operating 
on the principle ot "Take care of the sounds and the nonsense will take care of its· 
elt." The sentiments were appropriately edifying, and the elaborately studied and 
rehearsed phrasing no doubt evoked the expected applause. 
Academic humbug (Veblen) 
Any survey or the varieties of humbug should include specimens or the pre· 
tentious verbiage that infests scholarly writing. I reproduce the following Crom 
Thorstein Veblen's book, "The Theory of the Leisure Class," partly for the pleas· 
ure or resuscitating Mencken's commentary on it. 
12 
In an increasing proportion as time goes on, the anthropomorphic 
cult, with its code of devout observances, suff�rs a progressive disinte· 
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gration through the stress of economic exigencies and the decay of 
the system of status. As this disintegration proceeds, there come to 
be associatt>d and blended with the de\·out attitude cert.ain other 
moti\'es and impulses that are not always traceable to the habit of 
personal subservience. 
Not aJI of these subsidiary impulses that blend with the bait of 
devoutness in the later devotional life are altogether congruous with 
the devout attitude or with the anthropomorphic apprehension of 
sequence of phenomena. Their origin being not the same. their ac­
tion upon the scheme of devout life is also not in the same diredion. 
In many ways they tr.averse the underlying norm of subservience or 
vicarious life to which the code of devout observances and the eccles· 
iastical and sacerdotal institutions are to be traced as their substantial 
basis. Through the presence of these alien motives the social and 
industrial regime of status gradually disintegrates, and the canon of 
personal subservience loses the support derived from an unbroken 
tradition. Extraneous habits and proclivities encroach upon the field 
of action occupied by this canon, and it presently comes about that 
the ecclesiastical and sacerdotal structures are partially converted to 
other uses, in some measure alien to the purposes of the scheme of 
devout life as it stood in the days of the most vigorous and character­
istic development of the priesthood. 
Here we have garrulity laced with jargon. Mencken says that Veblen "achieves 
the effect, perhaps without employing the means, of thinking in some uneartlhly 
foreign language--say Swahili, Sumerian or Old Bulgarian··and then painfully claw­
ing his thought into a copious but uncertain and book-learned English" (66-67). 
As to the passages I have quoted from Veblen, Mencken concludes that Veblen is 
merely trying to say "that many people go to church, not because they are afraid 
of the devil but because they enjoy the music and like to look at the stained glass, 
the potted lilies and the rev. pastor" (69). He claims that "this highly profound and 
highly original observation" might have been written on a postage stamp, thereby 
saving a good deal of wasted paper. 
Misfits and violations 
With so many varied examples of humbug now before us, we can ask what it 
is about such episodes that inclines us to regard all of them, in spite of their obvious 
differences, as instances of the same complex phenomenon. Do we mean the same 
thing each time, or are we perhaps applying the pejorative label t.o cases connected 
only by shifting similarities, rather than by the presence of some detectable com­
mon property? 
Let us first recall the great amount and variety of information normally trans­
mitted in even the simplest and most familiar kind of conversation. Suppose the dri­
ver of a stationary automobile asks me the way to, say , Route 13: I would normally 
talce for granted much concerning the speaker's situat.ion and competence that is 
unsaid, indeed much that would mark the episode as perplexing if it were said: for 
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instance, that tht- driver wants to get to the highway in question. that he is en route 
Lo some otlher destination and that he doesn't know how to proceed. Also. on the 
t:vidence or his question. Lhal he is a nali\·e English speaker. who knows what he is 
saying and hasn 't made a sl ip of the tongue. Correspondingly. I assume that he him· 
self is making parallel assumptions about my own understanding of his problem and 
his reliance upon my willingness to help. ( ( shall ignore any further information 
possibly conveyed by signs of anxiety, distress and the like.) 
I prop� to speak iri such cases of the framing presuppositions of the initial· 
eel verbal t ransaction--or, more briefly, of the conversation's framework. Establmsh· 
ing thl.' framework--an operation so commonplace that we normally fail to notice 
it--determines the character of the initiated conversation in a way that is crucially 
important for the possibill ity of a successful outcome. (Of course much talk has 
little discernible purpose , amounting lo no more than friendly chatter or cocktail· 
party babble.) 
The centrality of the role played by what I have called the conversation's 
framework can be highlighted by cases of wilful falsification of the presupposed 
understand�ng.s. Suppose that on being asked by a stranger, "Do you know the way 
to the campus from here?" I simply reply "Yes!" That will probably get me a look 
of resentful incomprehension, especially so if I respond to the further question. 
"Would you like to tell me how to get there?" By saying "No!" Please notice that, 
far from lying, I may be literally--yet quite inarppropriately--telling the truth. In 
such a case I would of course be wilfully violating the conditions that normally 
make the kind of conversational exchange in question able to proceed. No doubt I 
would be resentfully regarded as "trying to be funny . "  If I then suffer a change of 
heart, pursue the departing stranger and, having caught up with him, say "Would 
you like me to tell you the way?" he might play the same down-putting game by 
saying "No!" (I have borrowed this example from F. C. Sparshott.) 
I shal l  now contrast two different kinds of ways in which intended exchange 
of information may fail. The first type of case, which I shall call a misfire, results 
from ignorance or incompetence on the respondent's part: I might mishear the 
number of the highway in question, or get the number right but!. not know how to 
get there, or might even be suffering from some painful anxiety that made me un­
able to help. In the absence of such impediments I might be simply inept in giving 
intelligible and useful instructions. Such misfires--or as our President recently called 
them, in his usual euphemistic mode when caught blundering, "failures of comm­
unication"··are sufficiently common to induce caution in relying upon testimony 
or authority, however generally reliable and useful. But the risk of misfire is no 
ground for radical skepticism about the feasibility o f  successful communication at 
least in relatively unproblematic cases. If one stranger doesn't know the way, per­
haps another does; if some passer-by is too stupid to understarnd my problem or 
too selfish to help, perhaps another will. 
Far more serious than such occasional hitches in communication ("misfires" 
in my terminology) are breakdowns in communicative interaction induced by de­
liberate falsifications of the constitutive framework. To start with relatively 
innocuous but still potentially pernicious abuses of this sort: a prankster might 
perversely pretend not to understand the motorist's question, or even pretend to 
be unable to speak (pointing meaningfully at his own throat) or even deliberately 
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act as if he were a lunatic. (The case I previously considered of an absurdly literal 
interpretation of a polite formula would also fall under this heading.) In such a 
case I propose to speak of a violation of the standard framework. Violations, unlike 
misfires, are not the predictable and excusable consequenct>s of human ignorance 
or incompetence. Violations maliciously trade upon and undermine the implicit 
understandings that underpin successful communication and co-Operation. and 
hence erode the foundations of social existence. (Imagine a society in which joking 
was so common that one could never be certaim whethn communications were 
serious or maliciously disruptive.) Violations of the understandings that sustain 
communication must be regarded as perversions of verbal interaction, animated by 
deliberate deceit. 
How humbug differs from lying 
We have already seen that violations of the communicative framework need 
not consist in the utterance of falsehoods. If I reply on the telephone to the q ues­
tion "Have you got any sausages today?" by saying "No," and continue in the same 
vein, saying that I won't have any in the foreseeable future, and the like, every­
thing I say might be literally true, but I would deceive the other as if I had deli ber­
ately lied. As William Blake said, 
A truth that's told with bad intent 
Beats all the lies you can invent. 
(Auguries of Innocence) 
However there is good reason to regard conscious and deliberate falsity--what Im­
manuel Kant calls "intentional untruthful declaration" (quoted by Bok, at p. 286) 
-as having primary theoretical importance. Sissela Bok, in her valuable recent book 
on "Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life" (New York, Vintage Books, 
1978) is following a long-established tradition when she confines her discussion to 
explicit lying, defined as the production of an utterance expressing what the speak­
er disbelieves (op. cit., p. 14). Let us call such an utterance, with acknowledgement 
to Shakespeare, the lie direct. Until further notice, when I speak of lying I 
shall mean the forthright utterance, as if believed, of a proposition disbelieved by 
the utterer. 
Moralists have long regarded brazen lying (the deliberate assertion of "the 
thing that is not"-or at least "the thing thought to be not") as meriting the sever­
est reprobation. Montaigne said: 
Lying is indeed an accursed vice. We are human beings, and hold 
together only by speech. If we knew the horror of it, and the 
gravity. we should pursue it with fire, and more justly so than other 
crimes. 
("Of Liars," in The Essays of Montaigne, tr. E.J. Teich­
mann [New York, Oxford University Press, n.d.] vol. 1, 
p. 30) 
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In such statements as this. lying is depicted as a. cardinal vice. an unforgi\'eable sin 
against humanity. Such a view led Immanuel Kant to claim--implausibly as I think­
that we have an absolute duty not to lie, even when a truthful ·reply would lead an 
intending murderer to his victim! If this rigoristic condemnation of lying and the 
correspon ding elevation or truthfulness to something like a supreme virtue were 
justified, it would be hard to understand the ai)s(>nce of reference to lying in the 
Ten Commandments (except in the special prohibition against .. bearing false wit­
ness") or in other religious compendia of vices and virtues. 
The traditional defenses of such rigorism are unconvincing. Kan t, like other 
writers on the subject, notices the damage inflicted upon the liar himself, but re­
serves his most earnest condemnation for the damage inflicted by a lie on all man­
kind. But as much can be said about all vice: every criminal injury to an individual 
also damage-s the moral fabric of society. Nor is a lie the worst injury: violence and 
willful crue�ty might be regarded as at least equally damaging to the moral charac· 
ter of the prepetrator and a violation of general obligations ne-eded for social life. 
A plausible justification of the prominence assigned to the vice of lying is 
suggested by glossing Montaigne's contention that as human beings "we ... hold to· 
gether only by speech." It is obvious that a child could not learn to speak if 
surrounded only by adults who lied to him irresponsibly and at random. For in 
such an environment he could not even learn tlhe common names of familiar ob· 
jects. Closely connected with this point is the familiar observation that the I iar is 
parasitic upon general, though not universal, veracity: lying, as a species of deceit, 
would be futile in the absence of general efforts to be truthful. It seems reasonable 
to conclude that a liar is, in a radical way, sapping the foundations of social institu­
tions, all of which depends upon the general effectiveness of speech . The liar is 
indeed an '"enemy of society," who tends to undermine all possibility of civilized 
intercourse. Universal lying would destroy intelligible speech. 
Still, an endorsemen t of Montaigne's emphasis upon the gravity of shameless­
ly explicit lying needs some supplementation, i.f it is not to be misleadingly one· 
sided. The immediate harm done by a successful lie direct··the deceitful generation 
of a false belief by concealed violation of the standard framework··can often be 
achieved more efficiently, and with less fear of detection or reprisal, by indirect 
means. One- can intimate "the thing that is not" by implication, by significant si· 
lence, or even by the double bluff or pretending to lie while actually speaking the 
truth (as in the classical Minsk-Pinsk joke). (The annals of espionage are a rich source 
for this kind of deception.) Such maneuvers, a common resource of advertising and 
diplomacy, are secure against the accusation of explicit and knowing mendacity: 
the offen der can always plead that he didn't literally _gy anything that he himself 
disbelieved. Given the prevalence and effectiveness of such indirect ways of achiev· 
ing the disreputable benefits of lying, it is surprising that we have no better label 
for indirect verbal deception than the lawyer's tag of suggestio falsi. We might 
perhaps speak in such cases of virtual lying. (Cf. Webster's definition of the rele· 
vant sense of 'virtual' as "being functionally or effectively but formally not of its 
kind.") 
With virtual lying, we are at last in the close neighborhood of the kind of 
humbug wh.ich "functionally or effectively" implants false belief. For in such cases 
there is characteristically a conscious discrepancy between the utterer's beliefs and 
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the false beliefs to be implanted. Such cases cannot properly be regarded as <'ast's 
of outright lying or e,·en \'irtual lying. but are all the more pernicious for that rea· 
son. The man who composed the ,·odka ad\'ertisement probably b<'lieved that tht> 
drink he was puffing was \·irtuaJly indistinguishable in taste and sedatin> power 
from any of the competing brands on the market. In eschewing direct lies or even. 
for the most part, ,·irtua1 lies for which he might be accountable. he was relying up· 
on the powerful forces of sUJggestion and association--with all of the nummery of 
the Czar's legendary court and so on-to implant what would have been a naked lie 
if explicitly stated. The difference between such cases of humbugging det't'ption 
and outright or even virtual lying is not in the content of the communicated mPss· 
age. nor in the intention lo deceive by implanting false beliefs. but rather in the 
sophistication of the means used to achieve the purpose. 
The continuities between explicit lying, ,·irLual lying and what I now propost> 
to call falsidical humbug (I borrow the term "falsidical '' from Quine). have tempted 
many writers to regard the conventional distinction between lying and humbug as 
superficially and ultimately misleading. Indeed some writers will assimilate to ly· 
ing even relatively harmless efforts to make a good public showing: 
Thus, Adrienne Rich, in her notes on lying says: 
We have expected to liie with our bodies : to bleach. redden. unkink 
or curl our hair, to pluck eyebrows. shave armpits. wear padding in 
various places or lace ourselves, take little steps, glaze finger and toe 
nails, we·ar clothes that emphasized our helplessness. 
("Women and Honor: Some Notes on Lying ( 1975)," 
reprinted in On Lies, Secrets and Silence: Selected Prose 
I New York, Norton, 1979 ] ,  p. 188), my italics.) 
(One supporting myth regards only nudity as genuinely natural and "truthful." all 
concealment and clothing being counted as hypocritical.) 
The tendency here illustrated to convert similarities into supposedly pro· 
found underlying identities (dressing and personal adornment as ••really" the same 
thing as lying) is a constant temptation for philosophically inclined scholars in 
search of excitingly paradoxical insight. For a splendid example one might turn to 
George Steiner and his startling rediscovery of "the creativity of falsehood" (After 
Babel [New York, Oxford University Press, 1975 J ,  page 220) which he characteri7,. 
es as "a seminal, profound intuition" of the Greeks [ibid.] ). 
Linguists and psychologists (Nietzsche excepted) have done little to 
explore the ubiquitous, many-branched genus of lies .... Constrained 
as they are by moral disapproval or psychological malaise, these in· 
quiries have remained thin. We will see deeper only when we break 
free of a purely negative classification of 'untruth', only when we 
recognize the compulsion to say 'the thing which is not' as being 
central to language and mind. We must come to grasp what Nietzsche 
meant when he proclaimed that 'the Lie··and not the Truth is di· 
vine!' (Op. cit., pp. 221-222). 
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Steiner q uotes Nietzsche again, approvingly, as saying, in The Will to Power: 
There is only one world ...  and that world is false, cruel. contradic· 
tory, misleading, senseless .... We need lies to vanquish this reality. 
this "truth," we need lies in order to live (Op. cit., 227). 
Steiner seems himself to endorse the view that "lying is a necessity of life" by 
which "man violates an absurd confining reality" i n  a way lhat "is at every point 
artistic I and J creative" (ibid.). 
This confused and shoddy defense of lying is what Bentham would have call· 
ed "nonsense on stilts." Steiner here seems to be emulating that kind of German 
metaphysician of whom Cadyle said none could dive deeper or remerge muddier. 
It is a prime example of the kind of academic or scholarly humbwg which consists 
of saying more than you can reasonably mean, for the sake of the booming sound 
of your periods (what the older rhetoricians called "Bomphoiologia"). If you fail 
to make the dlistinctions that I have been proposing between p�ain lying, virtual 
lying, pretentious innation of belief, and so on, proceeding so far,in Steiner's case, 
as to regard hypothetical if--then statements as cas,es of lying, you will end with a 
!kind of conceptual gruel in which everything looks like everything else and all in· 
tellectual distiinctions have vanished in the service of grandiose obfuscation. 
Still, a decent respect for the conceptual distinctions between plain and fan· 
cy lying, and the allied but distinguishable varieties of deceptive humbug, such as I 
am here advocating, leaves as yet undiscussed the question of relative harm. Tlhe 
subversive effects of the brazen liar, in undermining the foundations of linguistic 
institutions,might be compared to the gross outrages of violating the constitutive 
bases of other institutions. There is something peculiarly horrible and monstrous 
about a judge who accepts bribes, a farmer who adds poison to his corn, or a doc· 
tor who infects patients in order to ensure a steady income. But the adulteration of 
food, to stay with that example, may, in the not very long run, be even more harm· 
Cul than outright poisoning. The most serious indictment of falsidical humbug is 
that, without striking at the roots of linguistic institutions, it tends progressively to 
adulterate speech and thought. As a recent writer has well said: 
[The ] distortion of values, this insidious numbing of what we once 
knew without question as true or false, can be blamed, in part, on 
the language we hear and read every day and night. 
M. F. K. Fisher in L. Michaels and C. Ricks, The State of the 
Language (Berkeley 1980), p. 270. 
The complexities of self-deception 
When humbuggers say what they themselves disbelieve, evading the risks of 
lying, while reaping its benefits, the gross discrepancy between utterance and actual 
belief (the speaker's "stance") can sometimes be established beyond all reasonable 
doubt. If the perpetrator rebuffs the "Shavian probe"-"Do you really believe 
that?"--by insisting that he o:r she really did believe it, bolstering the original hum· 
lbug by a brazen lie, tone, facial expression or actions may expose the fraud. I call 
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such conscious deception .. first-order humbug ... 
Humbug is often less ob\·ious and forthright: Suppose a college student tells 
Nabokov that he is the greatest writer since Gogol (an imaginary but plausible 
episode). Any eavesdropper who knew the student's shaky standing in Naboko\''s 
course on Russian literature might question the flatterer's sincerity; but how is the 
impult'd "bad faith" to be established against reiterated protestations of sincerity? 
If we suppose the flatterer to be subjectively "honest" we might still impute self· 
deception. If so, we shall have a good example of a self-humbugger producing what 
I shall call "second-order humbug." 
Although self-deception is at least as common as lying, there is a difficulty in 
understanding how it can possibly occur. Consider the conditions for successful 
deception of one person by another. If somebody else is to be successfully de· 
ceived, what I say must seem initially plausible and my assertion of it must provide 
some reason for the other's acceptance. Hence, my own disbelief must be conceal­
ed. Should any of these conditions be violated, the attempted deceit will fail: if 
you say that you are the illegitimate son of the monarch , as one of the British spies 
used to do, your hearer will probably think that you must be joking (the intended 
effect!);  if you show by a wink that you don't believe what you say. your hearer 
will not succumb to the intended deception. The deceptive appearance must mas· 
querade as reality. 
Now how can one hide one's own disbelief in an intended act of private 
deception? ls it not absurd to say to oneself, "I don't believe such and such and 
yet I am going to believe it?" One cannot be an authority for oneself and nothing 
that I know that I disbelieve can be a reason for me to believe it. And how can I 
fail to know my own disbelief? 
Thus the following argument for the impossibility of self-deception seems to 
be conclusive: Humbug requires concealment of a deceptive intent; but if the 
speaker and the audience are identical, as in soliloquy, there can be no such con· 
cealment; so there can be no such thing as self -deception. 
One might respond by pointing to clear cases of what we call self-deception-· 
as when a woman shows by her words and actions that she still believes in her son's 
survival, although possessing proof of his death in battle. Anybody persuaded by 
the impossibility argument would presumably retort that what happens in such an 
instance is misdescribed as deception and ought properly to be called something 
else. But this would amount to an arbitrary change in language--motivated by 
nothing better than obstinate defense of a dubious argument. 
The impossibility argument is underpinned by the following conceptions: 
"Either you know that you believe what you say or else you don't. And in either 
case you can't be mistaken." Knowledge of one's own belief is immediately access· 
ible; and there is no middle term between belief and disbelief. Both contentions 
are wrong: knowing one's momentary belief is not, like a sneeze, a "hit or miss" 
affair; and various degrees of awareness may be involved. 
Consider the following typical example. Before meeting my doctor to hear 
the latest report on some chronic affliction, I resolve to "take a cheerful view." 
Then, while the doctor talks, I withdraw attention from, "blank out," anything 
that begins to sound like bad news, while attending closely to encouraging remarks. 
In this way, I end by genuinely believing a comfortable but wrong conclusion, 
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based upon deliberately selected and distorted evidence. When I ·•ctosed my ears" 
in this way against a sentence that starts with "Unfortunately your blood pres· 
sure ... " so that I barely hear the rest or the s.entence, did I !know what the doctor 
said? Did I believe what he said? Was I aware or using a strategy of selective 
attention in support or a predetermined verdict? In each case the answer has to be 
"Yes andl No". 
Did 1 hear the bad news about the blood pressure? Unless I am an unusuaJly 
talented :self-deceiver, I probably did-as shown by the fact that I might reluctanlly 
be able to dredge it up into full consciousness. But the censored news was relegated 
to "the back of my mind"; I knew it as I know that I am writing a letter, when 
attendjng to something other than the act or writing. One might say that I had 
"twilit" awareness of the suppressed material. (There is no need yet to invoke the 
unconscious.) Did I believe what I heard in this "twilit" way? Again, Yes and No. 
Yes, because unless I did believe it, on my doctor's unquestioned authority, I had 
no need to suppress it; No, since I managed to prevent the very question of belief 
from rising into full consciousness. Parallel -verdicts apply to the overall program 
of selective attention and wishful distortion that I executed. I knew what I was 
doing as I know that I am waJking even while thinking about something else; but 
having a normal distaste for distortion of evidence, I need to ignore my disreput­
able strategy. 
The foregoing analysis of what might be called, in Sartre's terminology, 
"bad faith" (mauvaise foi) seems to fit the most familiar cases of self-deception. 
It may not fit severe cases of the repression of unwelcome thoughts or tidings, 
where the strategy of selective attention and rejection can induce neurotic sym­
toms. But it does fit such testimony as the following, from a recent discussion of 
obesity: 
Even while on a binge [of gobbling] one vows to start a diet to­
morrow and emerge from it miraculously transformed. 
(Sylvia Robinow, reviewing Marcia Millman, Such a Pretty 
Face: Being Fat in America [Norton ] ,  New Republic, April 
12, 1980:35) 
A further feature of the process of selective attention and repression of un­
welcome input, in the service of what might be called "wishful acceptaniee," de­
serves notice. In brushing aside the "bad news" of which he is at least partly aware, 
the self-deceiver makes the welcome "good news" part of his consciousness, part 
of himself, as it were, while doing his best to pretend that what he partly heard and 
would Hke to forget simply did not happen. But it  did happen and he knew that it 
rud. So there is a kind of dissociation at work--as in the familiar cases of motives 
that are suppressed as unworthy. So long as the self-deceiver is in the initial stages 
of the process sketched above, he has a "divided self," a state of strain that is dis­
agreeable to all but accomplished hypocrites. 
But the constant practice or self -deception may produce a character that 
cheats as effortlessly as a bird sings: the mask eventually becomes ingrown. fits the 
face as closely as a death mask. Exposure of such inveterate self-deception is 
rufficult., since it requires a critical judgment of a whole way of life. When we are 
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coping wi th confirmed hypocrisy. ratht>r than momentary self-dt>N'ption. a vndict 
of humbug seems euphemistic. 
Yet the exposure of episodic self-deception is sometimes both practicable 
and useful. "Second-order humbug" can sometimes be detected , ('\'en if thP pTO· 
ducer is unshakeably comi need of subjective honesty and sincerity. It would 
itself be an act of humbug, howHer. to suppose that the critic can pride himself 
upon being free from the incidence of self-deception. Selecth·e and differential 
attention, repression, and dissociation are features of all perception and thouglht. 
And even "wishful acceptance" is not necessarily reprehensible. when it leads to 
beneficial results, at least in the short run. Should we denigratP the ''wishful be· 
lief" that one is going to win a contest when self-verifying predictions are involved? 
Humbug ineradicable? 
Ought implies can. say the moralists. So before considering anti-humbugging 
remedies, we ought first to hear the vehement objections of those who consider 
such a project dangerously quixotic because. as one recent writer has put it. "de­
ception is an inevitablP aspect of human action.·• That quotation comes from a 
critical review of Sissela Bok on lying--the only ad\"erse notice of her book tha.t I 
have come upon--by David Bazelon (in the Times Literary Supplement, August 1 1 .  
1978, pp. 908-910). 
Bazelon reproaches Bok for exclusive attention to outright atnd explicit lying-­
which he regards as a "disastrous" limitation--and he heartily dislikes her recomm­
ended maxim that "no one should lie except on the rarest occasions." Bazelon 
thinks such concentration on the impracticable "best" will "unavoidably assurt> 
that lesser forms of deception will be used more frequently, accompanied by a 
greater sense of virtue." He himself (a "lumper" rather than a "splitter") wants 
attention to be paid to "the phenomenon of deception in full, rich context." Lying 
should al ways be regarded, he claims as "the major form of modern power," short 
of actual violence, and hence "an actual or potential aspect of all action involving 
two or more people." Convinced as Bazelon is, then, of the ubiquity and inevita­
bility of lying as an exercise of power over the deceived, he ends with the following 
remarkable conclusion: 
Once the ubiquity of deception is appreciated, and also it.s central 
relation to power, the need of power to achieve one's purposes, the 
issue clearly becomes--which lie lo tell, when, to whom, and for how 
long (italics in original) .  
Now since Bazelon is operating with so broad and comprehensive a defini· 
tion of lying as a mode of deception, his argument, if sound, ought. to apply equally 
well to humbug. Indeed, I am sure he would regard humbug as merely a special case 
of lying. Applied then to humbug, his train of thought would seem to be somethEng 
like the following: Verbal humbug is an instrument for exerting power, by decep­
tion, over others; and such ubiquitous exercise of power is an ineradicable aspect 
of the human condition. Well, these might be his premises; but what is his implied 
conclusion? No doubt, that the only sensible questions are (to echo his remarks 
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about lying) how to humbug, and when, to whom and for how long. This view 
might appeal to anybody impressed by the prevalence of humbug in human affairs: 
but before succumbing to its attractive cyncism, we ought to notice that the sup­
porting argument is invalid. Think or parallel relf'lections about, say dirt or infec­
tion: that. perfect cleanliness is a mirage, and so the only que-stions sufficiently 
practical to be worth considering are how much dfrt to tolerate- and in which cir­
curru;tances. As a correction to an impracticable perfectionism, the position is 
acceptable. But what is indefensible is surely the barely conceaJed suggestion that 
there is no !harm in dirt, or that nothing needs to be done about it. It would be a 
gross example or the !aJlacy. for which there is no speciaJ label, or arguing from 
ideaJ impractibility to permissive laissez faire. We need not be committed to the 
utopian project or a society completely free from humbug in order to hold, as I do, 
that the evil should be combatted to the best of our ability. Humbug might well be 
as ineradicable as degeneration and death; but that is a poor reason for indifference 
or complacency. 
Coping with humbug 
I shall now try to keep my original promise to say something useful about 
how to cope with humbug. I hope you will agree that while humbug has the short­
term advantages of devious hypocrisy over naked felony, it is indeed an insidious 
and detestable evil. 
In order to cope with humbug we need, of course, to be sensitive to its 
occurrence. One soon develops a nose for it: indeed there is a danger of becoming 
over-sensitive and tiresomely overzeaJous in its exposure. 
For short-term remedies, I recommend first the ploy that I earlier called the 
"Shavian probe"··the deliberately naive and rather impolite challenges expressed by 
the questions, "Do you really believe that?" and "Do you really mean that?" (If 
the answer is Yes--one miight then use one of G.E. Moore's favorite expressions: 
"How extraordinary!") A more elaborate maneuver is to tak,e the humbugging 
formula literally, in order to reveal its latent exaggerations and absurdities. Thus, 
if somebody solemnly delivers the shoddy bit of proverbial wisdom that "The 
exception proves the rule," one might trump it  by saying "Quite so: the more 
exceptions, the better the rule!" But a more useful therapy is to translate humbug 
into plain and clear English. Such translation is especially effective in coping with 
learned humbug. (The abuse involved is a kind of converse of the Emperor's clothes 
··too many clothes and no emperor!) Strongly to be recommended, also, are humor, 
parody, and satire. (The glorious response, for instance, of the philosopher Samuel 
Alexander, in his deaf old age, shaking his ear-trumpet with laughter on being intro­
duced to a Harvard professor: "I must be getting very deaf--1 thought you said he 
was a professor o"f Business Ethics!") Certain basic texts are very helpful: for instance, 
Swift's "Modest Proposal,." Sydney Smith� "Noodles Oration," Flaubert's diction­
ary of received opinions, Frank Sullivan's interviews with Mr. Arbuthnot, the cliche 
expert, and some of the splendid parodies of Russell Baker. 
Fortunately, literature provides wonderful portraits and caricatures of su­
preme humbugs-·Dicken's Pecksniff, Uriah Heap, Podsnap and many more; Moliere's 
Tartuffe and Alceste: and the "confidence men" of Melville and Thom& Mann. 
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And much can be learned from a long line of exempla� ant1-humbuggers: among 
whom I would include Dr. Johnson. Samuel Butler. Sydney Smith. Chekho\'. 
George Orwell. :\abokoY. E. B. While, and Adlai U'H'nson. 
It would be satisfying to be able to end with some concise and accurate dt>lini· 
lion. The best I can now prO\;de is the following formula: 
HUMBUG: deceptive misrepresentation, shorl or lying. t>speciall� b� 
pretentious word or deed, or somebody's own thoughts, feelings or 
attitudes. 
This covers only first-degree humbug. For second-degree humbug, produced by a 
self-deluded speaker or thinker, the unsatisfactory reference to thoughts, etc., would 
need replacing by something like "thoughts elc. that might bt' re\!t'&led by candid 
and rational self-examination ." I must leave the problems concealed i n  this all-too­
brief formulation for another occasion. 
A good way to end is by recalling Barnum's warning that the greatest hum­
bug of all is one who sees humbug everywhere. 
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